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valuation is one of a number of so-called 
‘higher order’ cognitive processes that are 
involved in the brain’s survival activities, 
including those extensions of basic coping 
processes (such as concept formation) that go 
into scientific and technological developments 
(like hypothesis testing). Some of these have 
been brought into various theories of learning 
and teaching. For example, in the (Benjamin) 
Bloom taxonomy, evaluation is listed as the 
intellectual activity at the top of the pyramid of 
skills at which teaching can be aimed. In this 
note, we’ll look at some of the other cognitive 
processes that need to be distinguished from 
evaluation, and look at unpacking evaluation 
into some component processes. Doing this will 
help us avoid some confusions that hamper 
effective evaluation work, and also provide 
another kind of foundation for an epistemology 
and logic of evaluation. 
The basic perspective here is that the animal 
brain is potentially drowning in an ocean of 
information. It is often suggested, although the 
calculations seem a little speculative, that the 
optic nerves alone could pass enough raw 
information to the human brain in a day (or at 
any rate, in a few days) to completely fill the 
brain’s huge memory storage facilities. That 
would make it impossible to learn from 
subsequent experience since there would be 
nowhere to store the new knowledge. Worse, 
retrieval would be extremely slow, making 
response time to signs of danger hopelessly 
slow. Species survive because their eyes and 
brains evolve ruthless methods for filtering and 
storing the data flow, and for finding and 
replacing previously stored information. With 
some help from genetically carried templates, 
the brain—and its extensions in the eye—
begins this process by developing concepts in 
terms of which it organizes the inflow, thereby 
vastly compressing what would otherwise be an 
unmanageable flood of data into packages with 
their own small labels. The packages—for 
example the multimedia package for mother—
are recognized more or less instantly, and can 
be stored and retrieved economically and hence 
quickly.  
The next step up from concept formation is 
generalization. Any regularities in the flow of 
conceptualized data are, in their turn, converted 
into economies in reception and retention. At 
the commonsense level, this translates into 
patterns which directly alter our responses and 
expectations, possibly named—for purposes of 
passing them on to children or peers—as saws 
or sayings like ‘red sky at night, shepherds’ 
delight’. A major function of science has been 
to extend our repertoire of these regularities, to 
which we give the grander title of laws of 
nature. One of the popular myths about science 
is that these are actually exceptionless 
statements, but in fact nearly all the usual 
examples—the gas laws, Hooke’s Law, etc.—
are simply crude approximations1 (or quasi-
definitional truths). Exact or not, they are 
infinitely more useful than randomness for 
                                                
1 See “The Key Property of Physical Laws—Inaccuracy” 








organizing our thinking, our knowledge, and 
our predicting. So far, not too exciting; but the 
next step is quite interesting. 
The next step up is, in formal terms, the 
theory; and in cognitive terms it is 
understanding or comprehension. The latter 
aspect of the phenomenon was much derided 
by the positivists, who saw it as part of the sin 
of ‘psychologism’—substituting feelings for 
formal facts. But commonsense was not 
mocked; we all understand the ‘Eureka’ feeling 
when we get a grasp of a difficult concept, and 
it is the brain’s sign that we have pulled off a 
gigantic step forward in the fight against the 
flood of information. For the comprehension, 
or the theory that formalizes it for the scientist, 
is a generator of generalizations, it is a meta-
generalization. In fact, the commonsense of the 
matter is that in all but one in a million cases, 
what it generates is a pattern of expectations, 
constituting implicit knowledge—rather than 
literal generalizations, so the commonsense of 
the matter is a much more accurate rendering of 
what happens than the theory-creation account.2 
Now, what does all this have to do with 
evaluation? Well, gentle reader, has it ever 
occurred to you that the grade given by the 
instructor to the student at the end of a long 
interaction between them involving teaching 
and learning and testing and questioning is in 
fact an extraordinarily compressed 
representation of what is, for the registrar, the 
future employer, the parents, and other 
stakeholders, extremely important information? 
For all its faults,3 it. like Boyle’s Law, is an 
attempt at an invaluable summary of what the 
stakeholders really want to know, which is the 
answer to the question, How well did the 
student learn what was being taught in that 
course? 
                                                
2 I have expressed some of this in what I called the 
‘comprehension theorem.’ 
3 Attempts have been made to avoid grading, e.g., at the 
U of CA/Santa Cruz. These romantic excursions simply 
‘pass the buck’ to those reading the lengthy essays they 
produced as a substitute; who, essentially, converted them 
immediately into grades. 
To put it bluntly, evaluations are simply a 
higher branch of the tree of solutions to the 
problem of trying not to drown in unprocessed 
information. They are the results of combining 
large quantities of empirical information with all 
relevant values, in order to go beyond an answer 
to the question, What’s so?, to answer the 
questions, So what—and when, and to what 
extent, and for whom? And to answer it for 
people that don’t want to know all the details, 
but need to have them in hand as a defense 
against possible challenge. 
Evaluators often smile, or whine, about the 
fact that their clients usually only read the 
executive summary of their reports. But we all 
know there is often a good reason for this; the 
clients are drowning in the sea of information. 
They need the essence of it, and they need it to 
be reliable. They did (or approved) the work on 
finding a good evaluator, so they believe with 
some reason that the body of the report will in 
fact establish the results summarized in the exec 
summary. Reading it is, usually, not crucial for 
survival. Similarly, for admissions officers at 
colleges or graduate schools, or job gatekeepers 
at employers, the key information about one 
slice of the candidate’s quality is the grade 
transcript.  
So this note is just another way to put solid 
foundations under evaluation, to show how far 
from the truth was the view that evaluations 
have no place in science, which is concerned 
with real knowledge about the world, whereas 
evaluations are just expressions of personal 
preference. Of course, the people who were 
dismissing evaluation were also grading their 
students’ work, and defending those grades with 
good reasons. It turns out that the latter practice 
was nearer to the truth than their voiced 
opinion about evaluation. At least, that’s an idea 
to consider. 
